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BOOK REVIEWS

A SCENARIO OF THE FUTURE
Deitchman, Seymour. On Being a Superpower. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2000. 335pp. $32

This self-characterized “think piece”
about the future of U.S. national security
is the stuff of war college curricula, brought
to us by one of the nation’s leading
thinkers and practitioners on the subject.
Seymour Deitchman here describes a
likely world into which the only superpower will be thrust and offers some reasonable and insightful advice for
maintaining this preeminence.
Military planners routinely concoct scenarios of future wars to illustrate the
types of strategy and forces that would
most likely be effective in overcoming
projected enemies. Deitchman uses this
technique with great skill to depict the
requirements of a U.S. global security
strategy. His scenarios for each part of
the world are designed to leave anyone
who has ever worked in national security
affairs with sweaty palms. However, all
such scenarios are merely educated
guesses, often created to support the author’s predispositions and conclusions.
The value of envisioning a particular future his primarily in the stimulation of
new ways of seeing and thinking about a
problem, rather than in any predictive
accuracy. These scenarios are intended to
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rattle one’s comfortable mindset. That is,
while no single element of any of them is
implausible, that any one could unravel
as unfortunately as these do stretches credulity. Deitchman does recognize that
any of his assumptions may be “ridiculously wrong” by the time the book is
published, and he is absolutely right on
this score.
Deitchman has his biases, and he is not
ashamed of them. He is an internationalist, and does not shy away from the necessity for the U.S. military to conduct
military operations other than war. He
does not favor national missile defense,
for both technical and political reasons.
However, Deitchman’s most controversial contention is that there will be only a
few overseas bases and that these bases
will always be “politically” vulnerable to
limitations by the host country. Indeed,
Operation ENDURING FREEDOM vindicated this claim, as we saw Army and Air
Force participation limited for some time
to Special Forces, strategic bombers, and
long-range refueling assets. This postulate about overseas bases leads
Deitchman to the conclusion that naval
forces (i.e., the Navy and Marine Corps)
should dominate the future American
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military. He devalues by this logic large
portions of ground and tactical air forces
supplied by the Army and Air Force, particularly in recognition of likely diminishing defense budgets. He is not opposed
to joint warfare. He supports all the
catchphrases (dominant maneuver, precision engagement, full-dimensional protection, focused logistics) popularized in
the chairman’s Joint Vision documents.
He just feels that, provided space and information superiority, the sea services
can execute the bulk of this strategy.
While Deitchman argues that the book is
descriptive rather than prescriptive, its
strongest points are its prescriptions for
developing a rational and affordable national military strategy. In particular, his
arguments for the development of technology-driven armed forces with information superiority are compelling. His
case against “lean” armed forces and
overreliance on the civilianization of military jobs is equally powerful.
Deitchman’s principal contribution to
the strategic debate is his approach to
handling two major regional contingencies (MRCs), if required. He opts to build
technologically sophisticated and highly
maneuverable conventional forces to address any military challenge (or to fight
one MRC) while explicitly threatening a
nuclear “rain of destruction” on anyone
irresponsible enough to attack American
vital interests while the United States is
so occupied. As a true strategist, he
thereby matches “ends” to “means” by
allowing himself the opportunity to reduce the size of the relatively expensive
conventional forces.
A large portion of the book is a seemingly
unnecessary primer on America and the
“exceptional” traits that either explain its
greatness or foretell its doom. Whether
or not the American education system is
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fundamentally flawed or Americans are
losing their work ethic obviously are debatable points. However, Deitchman’s
insistence that the United States engage
in this self-examination is useful and
meaningful. Most monographs on national security simply skip over this
realm and presume the solution.
Deitchman forces the reader to delve
deeper and to understand the social, economic, and psychological forces underpinning American security strategy. It is a
journey well worth taking, even though a
reader may disagree with the author as
often as not.
Unless one is fortunate enough to spend
a year at one of the nation’s war colleges
contemplating this subject, there is no
better way to view the process of developing U.S. national strategy than to
spend some time with this book.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Tucker, Jonathan B. Scourge: The Once and Future
Threat of Smallpox. Berkeley, Calif.: Atlantic Monthly
Press, 2001. 304pp. $26

In real estate, the three most important
things are “location, location, location.”
In nonfiction book writing, the counterpart is “timing, timing, timing.” The
publication of Scourge in early September
2001 could not have been more timely.
The book is not a rapidly compiled,
superficial response to the attacks of
11 September but an in-depth study of
smallpox. Jonathan B. Tucker traces the
history of the disease from ancient Egypt
through India to China, where it was
called “Hunpox,” apparently because it
was believed to have been imported by
the Huns. Smallpox, we are reminded,
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